The cold rain and the strong wind chased us into a cozy upstairs room at the Carrot Tree where we decided to discuss the war from a drier location. I found myself thinking that maybe if the weather had been as bad when the colonists were discussing the revolution then perhaps it would never have come to be, because the only thing I was willing to fight for was a hot cup of coffee and perhaps my PJs (lucky for me I got both without war breaking out). But as we discussed over lunch the colonists were much more devoted than I was. Our discussion took a number of twists and turns going from romance novels to minute men to slavery. The first topic of the day was women and how they learned appropriate behavior. Kerrison argues in her "By the Book," that women learned by reading romance novels and articles. These books were not the same as romance novel today where the man sweeps the woman off her feet and everything end up happily ever after. Instead, the served more as a what not to do guide by threatening women will all of the worst case scenarios they can think of to teach them to do the right thing. Of course, not everyone followed this advice or even though that the books were worth reading, and some women did swoon over the French soldiers and end up pregnant, but the books did serve an important role. The conversation then turned to McDonnell's article about minutemen and the gentry in Virginia. This article went hand in hand with Holton's "Rebel Against Rebel", both point out how the gentry did not want to lose status in this changing political atmosphere. McDonnell talks about the problems that Virginia faced with getting yeomen farmers to become Minutemen because they despised the way that the gentry ran the ranks. Holton makes clear that the act of Dunmore threatening to free the slaves was why they fought, not unhappiness with the current social system. They wanted change and hoped it would not come at the same time.

All three articles pointed to one major point, the culture of Colonial America was changing.

Pace's article explores the link between college students and pranks as well as violence. He asserts pranks were a manifestation of the immaturity that persisted in students; as long as these pranks were completed without professors or other adults discovering the identity of the perpetrator, guilty students did not lose face. However, if they were caught, their childishness would become common knowledge and the adult façade they were building for themselves will be shattered.

Young men at college were versed enough in the adult language of honor to recognize when their honor was being threatened. As their honor was tenuous at best, and newly formed, reactions to insults and challenges were sometimes unwise. Pace explains that college students were caught between two worlds, and that when presented with a challenge, they would often react in a more adult manner than their challenger expected. This led to fights that escalated with the presence of weapons. Young boys were literally fighting for their status as honorable gentlemen.

Students would also enter into contests of will with professors and administrators over matters they believed tied in directly with their concept of honor. Pace gives the example of students who refused to go to class because the bell that signaled the beginning of recitations and lessons was missing. When a replacement bell was rung by servants, students claimed this insulted their honor and worth. It was only when college officials installed the new bell in the tower where the old one resided that students accepted this compromise and agreed to attend class. Such conflicts were not meaningless; students were warring with the established men in the community to prove that they, too, were men.

William and Mary was home to these same activities mentioned by Pace's article. Students were fond of firing the cannon in front of the Wren Building, which was operational until the presidency of Lyon G. Tyler. In 1830, there was a riot involving students and masked leaders who roamed campus, threatening professors and destroying records. Dueling was a persistent problem here, as it was at other Southern colleges.

William and Mary has been around to witness the tumults of student riots and political changes since 1699, when construction was completed. The college was originally established as an institution for religious education, with the Reverend James Blair serving as president for 50 years. As it evolved, the school began to resemble a higher education institution more in keeping with the modern incarnation. Students were educated in the grammar school until they reached 16 years of age; at this point they could enter either or both of the secondary schools or they could leave the school and return home. With the support of Thomas Jefferson, the school began conferring formal degrees in 1799. In addition to evolving academically, the college and its main structure, the Wren Building, underwent physical changes. A series of three fires between 1699-1862 changed the Wren remarkably; the building transitioned from four stories to three; in addition, the inner division of the Great Hall was altered after the second fire in 1859.

1862 was important in the college's history; it marked not only the 3rd and final fire, but also brought the Battle of Williamsburg in May. The battle pitted Union and Confederate forces against each other for control of the town. Redoubts, which were earthwork structures built up on four sides, were built to cover the roads and provide protection for troops. On the morning of May 5, fighting broke out between the two forces at Fort Magruder. While Union and Confederate troops were engaged in battle, Winfield Scott Hancock was sent to attempt a flanking movement on the Confederate right. He succeeded, but decided to wait for reinforcements before proceeding to engage. Instead of the hoped-for troops, he received word that he and his troops were in a tenuous position and needed to pull back. Hancock, resented having to turn his men around when they were in possession of a strong position, finally agreed and led his troops back to redoubt #14. There they waited for the Confederates to follow them. The trap they set worked, and the Confederate attack was repulsed. Hancock's honor would not let him abandon his fight entirely, so he found a way around his orders. Overall, the Union forces were able to force the Confederates out of Williamsburg.

The carnage of battle was evident everywhere; for its part, the college served as a hospital. While the estimated casualties only numbered 3,843 (class handout), the encounter involved over 70,000 troops, rivaling the battles of Shiloh and Bull Run. Today, the Battle of Williamsburg is largely overlooked despite the number of troops engaged.

From the early beginnings to its survival of the Civil War, the College of William and Mary witnessed numerous fights for honor. Some took the form of struggles between professors and students as the latter tried to assert their value and worth as individuals and adults. Others took bloodier forms, as duels or fistfights. The Battle of Williamsburg was a battle for honor, too, since Confederates were fighting to maintain their way of life and their reputations as gentlemen. William and Mary's history also contains incidents when young men's "masks" of adulthood slipped; the example of students setting off the cannon in front of the Wren yard epitomizes this. Through its long years in operation, the college served as a testing ground for young men; they came here searching not only for education, but for acceptance into the adult world. College today still serves this function, albeit without formal duels and cannon.

Even before Cornwallis had begun to fortify Yorktown, the English were aware that the French navy was on its way to support the colonists. Clinton was sure that their destination was New York and attempted to draw all of the English forces to him there. He was overruled by Germain, but even with all of his forces, Cornwallis was unable to properly fortify Yorktown. Because of the high elevation, he was unable to train his guns on the beach directly below. To remedy this, he sunk many of his vessels in the water off both banks of the river so as to force any incoming ships to the middle area where they would be in range of his artillery. This decision is rational considering the information that Cornwallis was given, he was assured by Clinton that the British fleet would be coming to relive him as soon as possible. Unfortunately, after the naval skirmish between the British and French the British fleet was sent limping back to New York, with little hope of ample supplies to repair their ships. With this information, Cornwallis' decision to, not only sink his ships, but to kill most of his horses seems irrational. Cornwallis was expecting to be saved by the English navy, but without that as an option, he was left with no way to escape his poorly fortified Yorktown. His earthworks were shoddily made both because of the sandy soil and a lack of shovels. He abandoned his outer redoubts and withdrew to Yorktown, again, because he assumed the British navy was coming. Unfortunately, if he hadn't it might have slowed the American and French armies down long enough so that the British navy could have been of some help. They arrived a day after his surrender. This is not to say that they would have been able to rescue Cornwallis immediately, they still would have had to contend with the French navy. Also interestingly, Yorktown remains the only battle in which French and American forces fought together. It would have been impossible for Cornwallis to predict all of the forces that came together during that campaign that led to his surrender.

The first step in this siege started in New York, not Yorktown. Here Washington was in conflict with General Clinton and was working on a plan with Rochambeau. Both Washington and Rochambeau knew that the French Navy was on its way, and when word came that they were sailing for Yorktown the two men decided to switch their efforts to Cornwallis. Washington wanted to make sure that his men would be able to match out of the area undetected by Clinton, they did not have the time nor the efforts to face him in battle. Washington set up an entire campsite to make it look as though the troops were still there- the plan. The men the marched out to Virginia under the cover of night- the luck. Clinton was unaware of their departure until they were too far away to be stopped-the English failure.

Once Washington and Rochambeau reached Yorktown they were again met with a combination of skill and luck. Cornwallis never expected to face a battle, never expected the French Navy to show up in the York River, and certainly never expected to surrender. Because of this he made some dyer mistakes throughout the battle. Both Cornwallis and Clinton had thought that the French Navy would go to New York, and so Cornwallis sent half of his troops north to help Clinton. Then, once they realized that the Navy was in Yorktown it took time to repair the ships before the troops could go back south though all along Clinton said that he had given the troops the order to leave. Also, since they were under siege, Cornwallis slaughtered his own horses so that he would not have to feed them and also in an attempt to block up the river. He also went as far as sinking his own ships to keep the Americans and the French from advancing. After all, he never expected to need either; he thought that the English Navy was on its way and that they would simply get on the boat and leave. When he realized that there was no hope left he called for a retreat. 1000 men made it across the river to safety but foul weather damaged their boats and the rest of the men were stuck. Each of these assumptions and actions put America in a better and better place for victory.

We know that Cornwallis was not a bad general, so why did he make so many mistakes? The answer is simple; he had no reason to assume that the English and the French would work well together to present a united front, that the French Navy, and that his troops would fail to reach him in time. Never before had the English and French worked so well together, and it would never happen again. Never before had the French Navy come to the aid of the Americans, and it would never happen again. Clinton told him that his own Navy was on its way, he had no reason to doubt him. But these odd turns of fate all collided into one gigantic failure. Cornwallis did the only thing he could. He surrendered. The next day, his ships did show up but it was too late. The English had lost the South.

To be fair to Cornwallis, he could not possibly have known that the French would actually ally with the rebels. Nor could he have known that Washington had set up an elaborate ruse including troop movements and empty tents to make him think New York was the happenin' place to be in order to keep most of his ships out of the way. Likewise, he could not have known that Plymouth, while malaria infested, would possibly have not been the worst place for him and his troops to summer. Not only did Cornwallis not want to be in Plymouth, he didn't even want to be in Yorktown a town which reached its peak during the siege.
The final circumstance that Cornwallis could not have predicted was that, although he delayed fighting as much as possible on the assumption he would soon be relieved, Clinton would not actually arrive until one day after he surrendered. All of these situations combined actually made me feel a bit sorry for Cornwallis. He was being ordered by Lord George Germaine who stayed in England throughout the conflict, he was chronically undersupplied and popular sentiment was against him. There doesn't seem to be much in his favor aside from a vastly superior navy, as well as better weaponry (as long as it didn't fall into the hands of the rebels as some cannons did). For all that then English began the war thinking it would be brief, they certainly lost in a most inglorious way. Not that that negatively impacted Cornwallis' reputation; he went on to become governor- general of India twice and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

The English seem to have suffered from "It works on paper" syndrome in which the intended plans ought to work, but usually go terribly awry. The English assumed that most southerners would be loyalists due to their mercantile status. Trade with England was profitable and the areas of discontent had so far only occurred in New England. So, the idea was to cut off New England from the rest of the colonies to contain the rebels while acquiring supplies from Southern Loyalists. This worked about as well as when the same thing was attempted in 1607- in that it didn't. There were far more revolutionists in the south than previously supposed and they were not inclined to support Cornwallis. The fact that the colonists were in the habit of stringing up or driving out the loyalists certainly did not incline people to be overly vocal about their support of George III.

The English also seem to have counted on dealing mostly with the militia, which would have been to their favor. The militias were undertrained, underfunded and more likely to run back home since they fought in familiar territory. These would be the "farmers with pitchforks" Cornwallis was so contemptuous of (line courtesy of the second worst movie ever made). Our discussions today reinforced the idea that after the Battle of Saratoga, the war was a foregone conclusion. At the very least, Cornwallis' decisions combined with unforeseeable circumstances, made his defeat at Yorktown and near inevitability.

The image I have so often found, and, I admit, believed in myself, is that of Lee as an old, benevolent grandfather figure who cared deeply for his men and led them into battle, an invincible man with foolproof tactics and battle plans. Lee was a West Point graduate, one of the best. He'd served with distinction in the Mexican War as General Winfield Scott's aide and his information collected as a staff officer led to several crucial victories. He was even offered command in the Union army before war broke out. This man knew how to fight, and he knew how to fight well. Yet Lee kept taking wild risks, putting his army in great danger for no apparent reason. Supplies are the lifeblood of an army. Without them, an army cannot fight, it cannot communicate and it cannot eat. Knowing this, Lee chose to extend his supply line for the Maryland Campaign from Richmond up through Maryland practically just outside of DC, full well knowing that the Union army was gathered there en masse after its disastrous defeat at Second Manassas. All it would take was one cavalry scout to cut the telegraph lines, one quick skirmish to check the advance of the supply wagons and Lee's army would be in serious trouble. Yet Lee chose to go through with it. It was only after he'd established his supply line and made his way up through Maryland that he realized it might be a good idea to change his supply line and decided to cut through the Shenandoah Valley and Harper's Ferry, secure behind the mountains. While one could say that this was a premeditated lure to draw McClellan out of Washington, it was terribly executed. Lee could have split his army, hiding part of it behind the mountains and letting them take Harper's Ferry, securing his supply line from the beginning. Other union garrisons like Winchester had been evacuated, so it would have been logical to assume that Harper's Ferry wouldn't put up much of a fight. With Harper's Ferry taken, Lee could easily fall back over the mountains and join with the rest of his army without any fears of being attacked from the rear or breaking his supply line, thus meeting McClellan with a united force. During Antietam, Lee left his army only one escape route over the Potomac, and it was only the last minute arrival of A.P Hill's troops that kept his army from being annihilated. If Hill had come just an hour later or if Burnside had been a little faster, Lee would have been cut off.

At Gettysburg, Lee was no different. No one is going to be thinking straight when they're spending most of their time running to the outhouse. But that does not excuse marching men across a mile of open ground when all your generals are against it, many of your men won't go through with it, the opponent is the Second Corps, led by Hancock, and many of the regiments you are throwing into the fight were absolutely decimated just two days ago. A good general asks at least twice about the welfare of his men-once when they come out of battle, and before he sends them into battle again. Lack of men should not have been an issue. If all that wasn't enough of a clue to not go through with the attack, this tactic had been used by the Union at Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, leading to slaughter. Lee himself had seen this before, at Malvern Hill during the Seven Days, again with the same horrendous results. The idea itself is sound-break the center and the line will crumble. But this was during the age of Napoleon. Military technology had changed. Rifles had longer range and were slightly easier to load, meaning where as defenders could have gotten off one or two rounds with limited accuracy before engaging in hand to hand fighting, now defenders had time for four or five good shots before the enemy came within bayonet reach. Going up against the Second Corps, some of the best men in the Union army, with these changes in technology meant a severe pounding. Then there were the cannons on Little Round Top and Cemetery Hill, all firing away at the Rebel lines for all they were worth. Yankee artillery was better equipped and better trained than Southern artillery. Even with Alexander's bombardment earlier in the day to weaken the center, those cannons on the hills remained. With all this going against the Rebels, it is amazing that Lee even decided to go through with this idiotic plan, or that any men actually made it to the Angle and broke through for the time they did. Even if Pickett's men could have broken through as Lee planned, it would have required reinforcements to maintain the gap. These reinforcements saw the carnage on that open ground and turned tail-I would have too in their position-rather than make the march and be shot down like ducks in a row by the cannons on those hills. If Lee truly had even half the intelligence people credit him with, he should have known this attack would not only fail, it would be a complete and total slaughter. The South could not afford this. It simply didn't have the manpower to replace all those killed in battle, whereas the North could. Lee's actions here cannot even be called risks; it is simply madness.

The madness becomes even worse when one considers the battles when it appears. Antietam and Gettysburg were two battles Lee could not afford to lose. The entirety of the Southern plan for victory was based on getting England and France to come in on their side. England was the largest, most powerful empire in the world and France still had a reputation for power. With them on their side, the South could lift the blockade, allowing much needed food, arms and ammunition into the South as well as fresh troops. They would have stood a chance of winning. As it was, Lee's failure meant that Lincoln could publish his Emancipation Proclamation, effectively barring France and Britain from aiding much less recognizing the Confederacy. Gettysburg, as a great northern campaign designed to bring the war home to the Union might have pushed Lincoln toward signing a peace, or even brought a little aid from Britain, which still had observers within the Rebel army. Again, Lee's disastrous campaign lost them valuable foreign support, as well as strengthening northern resolve to see the south crushed. No other battles meant as much to the Civil War, to the Confederacy, as Gettysburg and Antietam. Lee, their beloved leader, was certainly not your average soldier. He held off the Yankee army for three years, and came within inches of winning. But when push came to shove, he became reckless, making dangerous and costly decisions that would in the end lose him, and the Confederacy, a war. I can only imagine how much blind love and trust his men must have felt for him that they and their descendants still believe in him. It is both very touching and very frightening, because it means many of us still see this war as a part of our lives, something that never ended, an ideal that must be strived for. As long as Lee remains on his pedestal, I think we can never really put the Civil War to rest.

July 3rd, 1862

Dear Anne,
I am taking advantage of a brief respite in our march to write you and tell you that I am safe and well. I know you are scolding me as you read this for not having written before, but your letter took some days to reach me and I have not found pen or paper till this moment.

I do not think that I ever truly saw war while I fought in the Shenandoah. A few hours of fighting, maybe a day, but nothing gained or lost, we simply hounded the enemy. But now, we have fought for seven days without end. Anne, it was as if demons of hell had fought on the battlefield instead of men and devoured everything in their paths. At Malvern Hill our men marched forward through an open field as Yankee cannon exploded around them. It was a slaughter. Even those places we mark as victories are steeped in blood. At Gaines Mill the Yankees had the high ground and surrounded it with three lines of fire. Generals ordered their men to attack. They marched forward through a hail of bullets and smoke so thick that more than one man tripped and could no longer march on. Sometimes all we had to guide us were the flashes of light as the Yanks fired at us. The 33rd arrived in the evening and we were immediately moved to the front of the line. Marching down that ravine was the hardest thing I have ever done. The ground was covered with bodies; we stepped more often on men than on actual ground. In the midst of all this carnage, someone, somewhere, broke through their lines. The Yankee line collapsed. We took the high ground, and we sent them running. Oh, what a chase it was, Anne! We chased them all the way to the James until we came within range of their gunboats and were forced to withdraw. But we beat them!

The Yankees have taken refuge at Berkeley Plantation for now. Some of the men say that it was Mr. Harrison, who lived there during the Revolution, who wrote the Declaration and not Mr. Jefferson. I do not know how they came by this idea, but since both men are Virginians, I see no problems with it.

Much of the talk around the campfire now, when not about this new history lesson, is of our new commander, General Lee. I must admit, I trust him more than I ever trusted Johnson. I would follow him into battle, even now, exhausted as I am, if he asked it. He has done a remarkable thing in the time since he came to command. This army is such a rag tag group of men, and so many are there to fight for their state; I cannot fault them for it, since I am here to protect Richmond and Virginia and those I love. This does mean however that some governments are reluctant to give up control of their troops and the threat is ever constant that they will call their regiments back to fight at home. We are dangerously divided. But Lee has created an army that speaks for the entire south, though we call it the Army of Northern Virginia. With this battle, this victory, we are more united in our cause than ever before.

While I believe in General Lee and his abilities, I am still worried about our army. Malvern Hill proved that some of our generals do not have the courage or the intelligence to take the initiative and change suicidal orders. MacGruder, who many consider a fine general for his defense of Williamsburg earlier this year, has been sent west. Some of our commanders, such as General Pickett, have never commanded in such numbers before. Others, again, like General Pickett, are wounded, or even killed, in battle, leaving command of the troops to less experienced men. I will admit I would not feel confident marching into battle with such men leading us if General Lee were not in command to oversee things.

These battles have also uncovered serious gaps in communications between divisions, and even brigades and regiments. General Jackson, it is said, did not attack when he was ordered to and instead waited till evening before moving forward. Attacks went awry because regiments could not find each other, or could not attack together. We are outnumbered, out gunned, and fighting a defensive war. The only way we can hope to end this war is to deliver a decisive blow to the North, and to accomplish this we must move quickly and with unity. Otherwise I fear we shall be drawn into a long war that we shall have little hope of winning without foreign assistance. Are the bureaucrats in Richmond making any progress at bringing England in on our side, Anne? Or do you think we will have to win this war on our own? We have the will to win-I have never been so sure of myself and our cause as I am now, and the men are now more than ever determined to defend their loved ones and their country-but we must channel this somehow into a mighty, unstoppable army. The sooner General Lee can unite us, the better. There has never been such a violent and sustained battle in this war before. The Yankees will not let this stand. I fear that they will set aside the gloves and will ransack the countryside, burn farms and plantations and take away as much food as they can carry. It is said that their generals only let Berkeley Plantation stand because it serves as a hospital. There is also the threat that they will raise more men to attack us. But if we strike soon, before they attack again, we may bring them to peace. Elections are fast approaching in the north. People are growing weary of the fight, and this battle will surely bring home to them just how terrible war is. Perhaps now those few Yankees with a conscience will elect those who understand our cause, and will let us create our own country. Perhaps now they will let us go.

I wish to believe that the possibility is a strong one. Yet, if I were in their place, I would feel determined to commit all my resources. The Yanks have not been truly serious till now. I fear that now they will not be so easy to defeat as before. But Richmond is safe. Without the capital, the Confederacy will fall. And if the capital were to fall, I should lose you. I have seen enough of fighting, Anne. Sometimes I feel I can only fight on because if I do not, the Yanks may win, and then you and our families would be in danger. I will endure any hardship to prevent that.

There is some good news that comes from this battle. I have seen your father and Joshua, your brother, though only in passing, for we were hurrying after McClellan. Neither is injured, and your father asked me to assure you that he will write soon, if only to escape a scolding from you and your mother. I hear rumors that the army may pull back to Richmond once McClellan is cleared from the Peninsula. If this does happen, I shall try to come and see you. Until then, I remain,
Yours,
Gabriel Donahan

A crucial element of the Seven Days Battle was the moving of troops. Both the Union and Confederate forces were forced to engage in this drawn-out battle in many different locations without reliable means of communication and despite confusing terrain. How appropriate that, even though we were driving in a warm van along marked roads, we got lost on our trip! Confusion was rampant during this campaign. As Joseph T. Glatthaar writes in his chapter entitled, "The Battle For Richmond: The Seven Days Campaign," coordination proved to be a continuous source of problems, especially for the Confederacy. Jackson could not keep up with the timetables that General Lee gave to him. While perhaps the blame rests partially on General Lee for issuing too many orders and trying to participate in too much at once, because this was not the only source of confusion, it could not have bee Lee's fault entirely.

Despite the Confederacy's confusion and delayed timetable, they won the Seven Days Battle. As Glatthaar observes, in a sense, this victory completely altered the fortunes of the Confederacy because Richmond was safe and they could turn their sights on the Northern territories. This would prove to be only short-term however; the Seven Days Battle had an even more significant impact upon the Union forces. The repercussions of this impact would be much more long-term.

In his article, "The Seven Days and the Radical Persuasion," William A. Blair describes how after the Seven Days, the Union strengthened their battle tactics and became more invested in the war effort. Blair exposes these three main factors as the Union's weaknesses: the fact that some Union generals were sympathetic to the South, that the South has little unionist support, and the exclusion of slaves from the military that desperately needed increased manpower. It did not seem that the Union leaders were intending to destroy the South. As an example of their leniency, General George B. McClellan sent a guard for General Robert E. Lee's wife and house. To the Union soldiers, this act made it seem that General McClellan cared more about General Lee's family than his own soldiers. On the other hand, the Confederacy knew that if they wanted to win this war and defend their succession, they were going to have to sacrifice a lot. They were prepared for the hard years ahead and the challenges they would face by remaining loyal to the Confederacy. Blair explained how even in Union-occupied territories, Confederate sentiments were strong. The Union's recognition of the Confederacy's degree of commitment to the war was the most significant impact that the Seven Days Battle had on the Civil War.

The Union was forced in an uncomfortable balance between the abolitionists and the democrats; this balance was managed for the sake of the Border States. The Border States of Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, Delaware and West Virginia could have sided with either the Confederacy or the Union. As noted in James McPherson's response to Barbara Fields, as a moderate Republican, Abraham Lincoln knew that prioritizing the preservation of the Union would be the most effective and lasting way of emancipating the slaves. He could not alienate the Border States by making abolition his declared priority. Slaves were not allowed to participate the in military in an effort to appease these Border States; then, the Seven Days Battle occurred. The Union realized that if they wanted to even have a chance to defeat the Confederates, they would need to incorporate former slaves in their military. Blair notes the difference between war Democrats and peace Democrats. He also explains how the North increasingly recognized that the Constitution of the United States does not apply to people who wage war upon the US. Sentiments were increasingly of the opinion that, "if someone has to pay for the war, it might as well be the South."

The "Radical Persuasion" that Blair references employs many methods. One of their primary points of persuasion emphasizes the barbarity of the Confederates. People trying to motivate and harden the Union highlight the Confederate use of torpedoes and the mistreatment of Union soldiers, both prisoners and casualties. The logic of this argument follows the form of "if our enemies are doing x, we are justified in doing x too." Congress finally amended the Constitution to allow President Lincoln the necessary power to mobilize additional troops and use former slaves for any purpose deemed necessary. Specifically after the Seven Days Battle, Congress passed a bill about the confiscation of rebel property. Blair argues that if the Union had won the Seven Days Battle, things would have been worse for them in the long run, and the Confederacy would have probably proved victorious. The loss at the Seven Days Battle was exactly the "push" the Union needed to jump into the war with both feet as the Confederacy had done a long time before them.

It is an understatement to say that the challenges that that we faced paled in comparison to the cruel carnage that the soldiers faced. When we trekked across the wet grass of the battlefields, we complained of the wind. As the time approached noon, our grumbling stomachs interrupted our focus. Even on the ride back to William and Mary, our minds could not help but to begin to worry about the piles of work that awaited us, a weight on our shoulders that would probably last until the late hours of Sunday night.

As I gazed upon the eerily serene "checkerboard" of battlefields and overgrown forests, I could not help but to think about the hellish scenes that occurred not 200 years ago. The bullets we saw in the basement of the Berkeley Plantation and the resulting conversation regarding amputation made it nearly impossible for me to even imagine engaging in a battle where bullet wounds and amputation were very likely to occur. I cannot begin to fathom how much courage the soldiers in the Civil War- as in any war- must have had in order to muster up the strength to fight. Especially in the South, young men ages 18-22 made up a significant portion of the army. They were full of energy and believed that becoming a soldier would provide hem with the constant adventure for which they hungered. With the unprecedented carnage of the 7 Days Battle, many of these young soldiers experienced horrors beyond their expectations. As DH Hill noted, it was not war, but murder.

The confusion and tension of the Civil War did not cease when Lee surrendered at the Appomattox Courthouse. The road to reconstruction would be long, and the road to equality for former slaves would be even longer. When I feel sick with worry thinking about my midterms, I should consider the more serious concerns of soldiers, their families, and their friends. The consequences of their actions are much more serious.

Our day began at Shirley Plantation, built by Elizabeth Hill and John Carter. Amazingly, the same family has lived in this home for the last 11 generations and continues living there to this day. One only needs to glance at the home to see that it is a stunning example of the super-elite. Like other Carter homes, Shirley displays wealth and prosperity, the marriage of John to Elizabeth follows the pattern of marrying those within your class (a trend that is continued by their children, grandchildren, ect), and the gentlemen living there in the 18th century prescribed to the upper-class way of life. A parlor was set up in the home with playing cards, indicating that gambling was also big in this home.

The next stop was Westover Plantation on the banks of the James River. This was the home of William Byrd III, a gentleman who earned the reputation of being a "bad man". Like Shirley, from the outside Westover oozes of wealth and importance. We approached the house from the river, viewing the home the same way that all of Byrd's visitors would have first seen the home. The architecture of the home alone would have shown people just how wealthy he was, but William Byrd III did not stop there. He also built two elaborate privies, one on each side of the house. Would his wife Lucy have gone out to use one of these? I doubt it. More than likely, this he was using these outhouses as another clear, visual marker of his wealth. He married Lucy Parke to increase his prospects as her grandfather was an important man in Virginia and her father in England. The label of "bad man" was earned because of his gambling habits. Byrd was a heavy drinker and an even heavier gambler. Treckel describes his habits in the article "The Empire of My Heart" and points out one particular incident where his wife had ordered a number of goods from England which made him so mad that he sold the goods. Perhaps he was one of the men who in reality could not afford to lose the large sums of money that he bet.

The last stop of the day brought us back to Williamsburg for a tour of Powhatan Plantation, the home of the Taliaferro family. Once again we saw the same signs of wealth. The home, though no longer in the style of the 1700, was large and elaborate. The family made sure to advance their status through the marriage of their daughter, Elizabeth, by marrying her to George Wythe. Our time and the information we received at this home was very limited, but they do seem to fit the mold.