I will confess myself guilty of holding General Lee in high regard. No man has been so loved by his men, or so idolized by his country. For a northerner, and a re-enactor to boot, this is complete heresy-I will probably be swamped with emails and facebook comments from my horrified re-enacting family shortly after I post this-but as someone who portrays southern civilians and is an ardent fan of Killer Angels and the movie Gettysburg I try to see both sides. Sometimes, though, certain facts are inescapable. After being faced with plain and simple facts, numbers and tactical decisions from the Antietam and Gettysburg campaigns, I cannot help but wonder how these men adored their general, and how he is still an icon today. All I can see now is an image and a man hidden behind an image, a pitiful shadow of his former glory.

The image I have so often found, and, I admit, believed in myself, is that of Lee as an old, benevolent grandfather figure who cared deeply for his men and led them into battle, an invincible man with foolproof tactics and battle plans. Lee was a West Point graduate, one of the best. He'd served with distinction in the Mexican War as General Winfield Scott's aide and his information collected as a staff officer led to several crucial victories. He was even offered command in the Union army before war broke out. This man knew how to fight, and he knew how to fight well. Yet Lee kept taking wild risks, putting his army in great danger for no apparent reason. Supplies are the lifeblood of an army. Without them, an army cannot fight, it cannot communicate and it cannot eat. Knowing this, Lee chose to extend his supply line for the Maryland Campaign from Richmond up through Maryland practically just outside of DC, full well knowing that the Union army was gathered there en masse after its disastrous defeat at Second Manassas. All it would take was one cavalry scout to cut the telegraph lines, one quick skirmish to check the advance of the supply wagons and Lee's army would be in serious trouble. Yet Lee chose to go through with it. It was only after he'd established his supply line and made his way up through Maryland that he realized it might be a good idea to change his supply line and decided to cut through the Shenandoah Valley and Harper's Ferry, secure behind the mountains. While one could say that this was a premeditated lure to draw McClellan out of Washington, it was terribly executed. Lee could have split his army, hiding part of it behind the mountains and letting them take Harper's Ferry, securing his supply line from the beginning. Other union garrisons like Winchester had been evacuated, so it would have been logical to assume that Harper's Ferry wouldn't put up much of a fight. With Harper's Ferry taken, Lee could easily fall back over the mountains and join with the rest of his army without any fears of being attacked from the rear or breaking his supply line, thus meeting McClellan with a united force. During Antietam, Lee left his army only one escape route over the Potomac, and it was only the last minute arrival of A.P Hill's troops that kept his army from being annihilated. If Hill had come just an hour later or if Burnside had been a little faster, Lee would have been cut off.

At Gettysburg, Lee was no different. No one is going to be thinking straight when they're spending most of their time running to the outhouse. But that does not excuse marching men across a mile of open ground when all your generals are against it, many of your men won't go through with it, the opponent is the Second Corps, led by Hancock, and many of the regiments you are throwing into the fight were absolutely decimated just two days ago. A good general asks at least twice about the welfare of his men-once when they come out of battle, and before he sends them into battle again. Lack of men should not have been an issue. If all that wasn't enough of a clue to not go through with the attack, this tactic had been used by the Union at Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, leading to slaughter. Lee himself had seen this before, at Malvern Hill during the Seven Days, again with the same horrendous results. The idea itself is sound-break the center and the line will crumble. But this was during the age of Napoleon. Military technology had changed. Rifles had longer range and were slightly easier to load, meaning where as defenders could have gotten off one or two rounds with limited accuracy before engaging in hand to hand fighting, now defenders had time for four or five good shots before the enemy came within bayonet reach. Going up against the Second Corps, some of the best men in the Union army, with these changes in technology meant a severe pounding. Then there were the cannons on Little Round Top and Cemetery Hill, all firing away at the Rebel lines for all they were worth. Yankee artillery was better equipped and better trained than Southern artillery. Even with Alexander's bombardment earlier in the day to weaken the center, those cannons on the hills remained. With all this going against the Rebels, it is amazing that Lee even decided to go through with this idiotic plan, or that any men actually made it to the Angle and broke through for the time they did. Even if Pickett's men could have broken through as Lee planned, it would have required reinforcements to maintain the gap. These reinforcements saw the carnage on that open ground and turned tail-I would have too in their position-rather than make the march and be shot down like ducks in a row by the cannons on those hills. If Lee truly had even half the intelligence people credit him with, he should have known this attack would not only fail, it would be a complete and total slaughter. The South could not afford this. It simply didn't have the manpower to replace all those killed in battle, whereas the North could. Lee's actions here cannot even be called risks; it is simply madness.

The madness becomes even worse when one considers the battles when it appears. Antietam and Gettysburg were two battles Lee could not afford to lose. The entirety of the Southern plan for victory was based on getting England and France to come in on their side. England was the largest, most powerful empire in the world and France still had a reputation for power. With them on their side, the South could lift the blockade, allowing much needed food, arms and ammunition into the South as well as fresh troops. They would have stood a chance of winning. As it was, Lee's failure meant that Lincoln could publish his Emancipation Proclamation, effectively barring France and Britain from aiding much less recognizing the Confederacy. Gettysburg, as a great northern campaign designed to bring the war home to the Union might have pushed Lincoln toward signing a peace, or even brought a little aid from Britain, which still had observers within the Rebel army. Again, Lee's disastrous campaign lost them valuable foreign support, as well as strengthening northern resolve to see the south crushed. No other battles meant as much to the Civil War, to the Confederacy, as Gettysburg and Antietam. Lee, their beloved leader, was certainly not your average soldier. He held off the Yankee army for three years, and came within inches of winning. But when push came to shove, he became reckless, making dangerous and costly decisions that would in the end lose him, and the Confederacy, a war. I can only imagine how much blind love and trust his men must have felt for him that they and their descendants still believe in him. It is both very touching and very frightening, because it means many of us still see this war as a part of our lives, something that never ended, an ideal that must be strived for. As long as Lee remains on his pedestal, I think we can never really put the Civil War to rest.